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as the basis for this analysis, this strategic research paper will identify three systematic issues regarding the refocus to the Pacific. First, we must frame the current operational environment in the Asia-Pacific to support harmonization of our nation's strategic interests in the region. Second, we must identify the wicked problems in the region and determine the military's role in addressing these problems? Finally, we must specify a realistic end state of the nation's shift to the Pacific that supports the strategic vision yet does not disrupt relations with our Asian partners and related alliances.
Rebalance to the Pacific: Resourcing the Strategy
US economy and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. 1 A year has passed since President Obama spoke at the Australian Parliament House in Canberra, announcing the United States' pivot to the Pacific. The intent of the President's visit was to guarantee that the United States will play a larger and long term role in shaping this region [Asia-Pacific] and its future." 2 Using an operational approach for this analysis, this strategic research paper identifies three systematic issues regarding the refocus to the Pacific. First, we must frame the current operational environment in the Asia-Pacific to support the nation's strategic interests in the region.
Second, we must identify the wicked problems in the region and determine the military's role in addressing them. Finally, we must specify a realistic end state of our nation's shift to the Pacific that supports the strategic vision yet does not create an environment of trepidation on our Asian partners and alliances.
As the war in Afghanistan ironically becomes enduring, as Iran develops nuclear weapons to the dismay of our close ally Israel, as North Africa becomes the nexus of This rapid economic expansionism has precipitated a giant demand for energy throughout the region. Because of China's explosion in industry and modernization and because of developing neighbors, energy demand has increased dramatically in recent years. The demand is primarily for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil.
Japan and South Korea have no domestic oil reserves so these two key United
States' allies are solely dependent on imported oil. China imports 50 percent of its oil, while India imports 75 percent. The Asia-Pacific has accounted for 66 percent of growth in global oil demands over the past two decades and is forecasted to climb past 85 percent in the next two decades. 6 Over the years, regional tensions have risen over shrinking access to new oil fields; regional countries rely heavily on imported oil from the unstable Middle East.
Meanwhile, the global demands of LNG have increased 10 percent each year to run Asia's industries and power generation. 70 percent of the world market of LNG is currently traded by Asia. 7 Prices of LNG have increased this past year in the wake of the Fukushima disaster since Japan has taken measures to decrease its nuclear energy capacity and transition to LNG to meet the country's electricity needs. Because of Japan's natural disaster and China's modernization, the short term availability of LNG is questionable.
Asian-Pacific countries rely heavily on the Persian Gulf states for their energy. In fact, several of our allies import crude oil from Iran, a country against whom the United it's cheaper than the US and Israeli drones to boot." 8 With a flight endurance capability of 20 hours, it could be used for a variety of roles-reconnaissance, surveillance, and surface attacks. Both sides claim the drones will be used for surveillance. But experts estimate that the possibility of future drone skirmishes in the region's airspace is very high.
In the 1980s China discovered the Pinghu oil and gas fields located in the East China Sea. It is uncertain and problematic in determining the amount of hydrocarbon reserves in this region, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates these fields contain somewhere between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil. 9 The LNG estimates are also robust: In the Xihu/Okinawa trough, it is estimated that as much as 250 trillion cubic feet of LNG reserve. 10 As countries and foreign ventures compete for blocks of hydrocarbon reserve fields in the East China Sea, there is concern about increasing traffic in the shipping lanes that cross through fields that are being explored 6 and drilled. As tension rise in this area, the United States diplomatic position is to avoid friction with the Chinese while still meeting obligations in the bilateral Article 5, U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, requiring the United States to defend Japan.
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In the South China Sea, there is another territorial dispute over islands known as the Spratlys. Six countries currently lay claim to these islands: China, the Philippines, North Korea said the "great successor," as the younger Mr. Kim has been called, will faithfully follow his father's songun, or "military-first" policy. This proclamation has raised tensions with Washington and Seoul. 12 In the years to come, North Korea may develop a nuclear-tipped warhead capable of reaching the United States' West Coast.
The regional and global security threat from this dictator will require a strong military presence and an active diplomatic process that the United States has yet to achieve.
7
Another area of concern is the geophysical stability of the ocean floor. Plate tectonics are shifting the sea floor daily, creating constant seismic activity. Known as the Ring of Fire, this horseshoe shaped region extends from New Zealand north around Alaska and down the western seaboard of the Americas; it hosts over 450 volcanoes. 13 This AOR is certainly no stranger to tsunamis and typhoons.
Seventy percent of the Asia-Pacific population lives within 60 miles of a coastline.
A high-density population explosion in sub-India has led to a scarcity of fresh water. defense forces, and air defense forces and only 55 percent of its submarine fleet could be considered modern. 20 Currently, U.S. naval officers chuckle at China's "five minute Navy," but winds of change are coming.
In the next six years, the United States will have a larger footprint the Pacific.
Military resources will be increasingly distributed to enhance a regional presence. The LCS is the first of a new family of surface ships that is fast, highly maneuverable, and networked surface combat ship. 21 LCSs are relatively inexpensive to operate. Broadly speaking, the United States strategic challenge is to create regional stability within Asia-Pacific within the next ten years, to set conditions for market economies to thrive without putting their economic and security interests at risk, and to dissuade aggressive behavior by China through an enhanced regional cooperation forum-all the while protecting the region from natural disasters and pandemics, from illicit drug and human trafficking, from terrorism and boarder disputes, all on the cheap."
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Add to the difficulty, the AOR borders five geographic combatant commanders resulting in unique strategic complexity.
As a fiscally constrained nation in transition, the United States' strategic ambiguity in the Pacific creates uneasiness with our Asia-Pacific allies. What has driven this rebalance? Surely, the United States is concerned about the stability in the growing Asia-Pacific region. It is the center of world's trade; it is the most economically vibrant region in the world. For the past eleven years, the United States has been preoccupied, indeed pinned down in Southwestern Asia, battle hardened against the war on terror. PACOM will assert that the combatant commander never abandoned his commitments to the region. PACOM will assert that military presence-the "M" in the "DIME" (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) concept-was always at hand.
Since the Spanish American War and the annexation of the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States has always projected power in the Western Pacific. The United States has been and will continue to be the leading security player in Asia by building and maintaining its strategic ties and with more arrangements with more Asian states than any other non-regional player. 25 Today, it is no secret that the global center of gravity is the Asia-Pacific: It is the furnace that heats the world economy.
The rebalance towards the region will be a gradual process. The plan does not represent a sudden military presence. Rather, it initiates a slow and methodical process to build long-term defense engagements, to promote theater cooperation, and to rely on diplomacy. If the Administration's strategic guidance directs this rebalance, then it must harness all the strengths of national power in a whole-of-government approach. Trade and diplomacy are as important as military capabilities.
Central to any strategy will be successful effort to of strengthen partnerships with allies and friendly states. 26 The United States has seven mutual defense treaties or security cooperation acts with its Asian allies located in China's backyard. Though the State department is largest shareholder in the DIME concept; it is responsible for building partnerships in the Asia-pacific region. But our military relationships in the region play an undeniable part in these partnerships. Every year PACOM expands its bilateral and multilateral exercises while increasing our defense trade with our AsiaPacific partners. So a balance is required in relationships with our Asia-Pacific allies. States must balance a transparent diplomatic and economic relationship on one hand but continue to maintain the upper hand militarily without creating tension.
The second objective is to execute an affordable strategy. As the Navy continues to reduce the number of ships in the global fleet, it is called upon to increase its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. . We must always maintain a symbolic presence in the region. One option to make the rebalance work is to reposition a second Amphibious Ready Group into the Pacific. In the future, this may not require a symbolic carrier battle group-a single destroyer may suffice. The problem then becomes an operational risk.
There are many concerns with AirSea Battle. First, how much will it cost? With the current fiscally constrained military budget, we have already seen reductions of forces in the Marine Corps and Army, slowdown of the production of attack submarines and in development of a new joint air launched cruise missile to replace the Tomahawk.
There is also a slowdown in production of Aegis class destroyers at the same time the Navy is decommissioning its cruiser class. Production numbers of the fifth generation F-35 JSFs have dropped service-wide as cost per plane has increased. All these platforms are integral pieces in the AirSea Battle concepts. The concept has some merit. However, the nation should still remain focused on resourcing Afghanistan, on the rise of insurgencies in Africa, and the volatility in the Eastern Mediterranean. As one unnamed General stated, "I don't want to chase bright lights when it comes to AirSea Battle!"
The United States must strengthen regional security to off-set these fiscal constraints. The days of the United States doing it alone is twentieth-century thinking.
Stability in this region must be intertwined with a broader multi-national partnership. and it must establish a civil-military disaster relief hub in the Asia-Pacific region for
